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Factors Affecting Participation of Italian Farmers in Rural 
Development Policy 
Pascucci S., Capitanio F., Adinolfi F. and De Magistris T. 
 
Abstract 
In this paper a (micro)econometric approach is developed by considering the farmer 
likelihood to participate in different policy programs as linked to the objective of farmer to 
maximize their welfare. In this way we model farmers participation in policy support scheme 
by using a new institutional economics approach and conceptualizing the decision to entry as 
a contractual choice between two rural development types of policy. Different discrete choice 
modelling approaches are used to analyze the complementarity/ substitutability of different 
policy programs such as environmental-related measures and farm investment supports 
policy schemes and the main driving factors behind them.  
We use an extensive cross-sectional database related to the Italian FADN 2006. Results 
indicate that social capital and institutional factors should be taken much more into account 
in order to understand farmers likelihood to entry in policy support schemes. Location and 
farm(er) socio-economic features are also relevant factors. Moreover complementarity has 
been found between different policy schemes. 
 
Keywords: Rural development policy, contract design, discrete choice modelling, Italy 
 
JEL classification: Q12, Q18.  
1. INTRODUCTION  
Rural Development Policy (RDP) is a considerable source of financial support for 
European farmers and rural communities (Dwyer et al., 2008). Still many farmers and rural 
actors are not benefiting adequately from RDP, mainly due to lack of capacities to access and 
use this financial support. If, however, factors that constitute a barrier to participate could be 
better understood and adequately addressed, a larger number of farmers and rural actors could 
benefit from RDP support and increase their welfare. Unfortunately this mechanism is still not 
completely clarified.    
Previous papers have studied farmers’ motivations for participating in different RDP 
measures. These papers have been focalized mainly on farmers’ participation in Agro-
Environmental Schemes (AES) in different EU contexts1. They have shown that decision are 
driven by a plurality of potential factors such as farm structural features, specialization, non-
farm activities, local context, policy networks, institutions, farmers’ attitudes (Beedell and 
Rehman, 2000; Wynn et al., 2001; Defrancesco et al., 2008). The way these factors interact 
and influence the farmers likelihood to enter or not in RDP measures is crucial to understand 
the capacity of a policy intervention to be successful but gaps and puzzling issues still remain. 
                                                     
 
 
1 The list of papers analyzing European farmers participation in agri-environmental schemes and measures is extensive. 
Interesting overviews have been recently provided by Defra (2006) and Defrancesco et al. (2008).   
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For example whether or not participating in AES also increases the farmers’ likelihood to 
participate in other types of RDP measures such as investment and marketing-related ones.  
If such correlations and interrelations do exist, these factors might be used to better 
predict farmers behavior. We propose to take a first step in developing a predicting model.  
Therefore the aim of this paper is to analyze the likelihood of Italian farmers to 
participate in different policy program. More specifically we aim at answering the following 
research questions: (i) what combinations of factors correlate significantly with the 
occurrence of participation in RDP measures? (ii) To what extent do the factors explain the 
variance of participation in RDP measures by different types of farmers? (iii) What is the 
specific role of institutional factors? 
To address these research questions we decide to model farmers participation in RDP 
measures by using a new institutional economics approach and conceptualizing the decision 
to participate as a choice between different contractual solutions (Masten and Saussier, 2002). 
A (micro)econometric approach has been developed by considering the farmer likelihood to 
participate in different Rural Development Policy related contracts (RDP contracts) as linked 
to the objective of farmer to maximize their welfare. Our hypothesis is that different RDP 
contracts could be implemented at farm level to reach this goal simultaneously. Accordingly 
we model the choice setting as constitute by two main types of RDP contracts: a first type 
which related to schemes supporting economic competitiveness of the farm, such as 
investments and marketing (SCS); a second type which relates to schemes supporting the 
provisions of environmental services, such as AES, afforestation and extensification (SAS).  
The contractual design perspective has been applied in several context and it is in line 
with other papers’ approach which tries to model farmers participation in AES and RDP 
measures (Jongeneel et al., 2008; Polman and Slangen, 2008; Peerlings and Polman, 2004; 
2008; 2009). In this approach the role of institutional factors, such as social capital, local 
networks, formal rules of a given socio-economic context can be emphasized and specifically 
addressed. Moreover in this approach both contractual design and associated transaction costs 
assume a central role to define the explanatory variables involved in the farmers’ decision 
making.  
To empirically test our research questions we use an extensive cross-sectional database 
related to the Italian FADN 2006. The econometric strategy is reflected in the application of 
two different discrete choice modelling approaches, such as a bivariate probit (BVP) model 
(model 1) and a multinomial logit (MNL) model (model 2). The BVP is used to analyze the 
complementarity/substitutability of different policy programs such as SCS and SAS contracts 
(Polman and Slangen, 2008);  the MNL model follows the usual econometric approach to 
analyze this type of farmers’ behavior and it is also used as benchmark (Defrancesco et al., 
2008; Peerlings and Polman, 2009).  
To our knowledge this is the first paper which tries to approach farmers’ participation 
in different types of RDP contracts and to quantify the interconnections between them using 
this econometric strategy. The results are compared with other conclusions provided in other 
papers in order to use our Italian case study in the overall discussion around participation of 
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the European farmers in RDP contracts. These results are rather new for the Italian context 
and they can contribute to improve policy-making debate at the EU level. 
2.  THEORETICAL MODEL  
In this paper we use a model originally introduced by Peerlings and Polman (2009)2 by 
extending it to all types of RDP contracts. In the PP model it is assumed that farmers 
maximise the expected value derived from the individual contracts selected. Therefore by 
choosing  a contract farmers allocate (part of) their resources (i.e. land and capital) to that 
contract. Typically in AES contracts resource allocation involves farmland while in other 
types of RDP contracts, such as investment support schemes, it mainly involves capital goods 
(buildings, machineries, financial capital).  
In this model if an unit of resource is used for contract A (i.e. one hectare is enrolled in 
biodiversity protection contract) it cannot be used for contract B (i.e. land improvement). 
However, as in the original PP model it will be assumed that more than one contract can be 
selected by one farmer (Peerlings and Polman, 2009). So the model can be perceived as a 
resource allocation model. Farmer j decision space relates to the optimal allocation of 
resources ( j
−
θ ) in order to maximise her expected value (Yj) deriving from contracting 
decisions3:  
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where E is expectations operator; Yj total value from contracting for farmer j; sjY is the 
value of choosing contract s by farmer j; 
js
p is the payment/support received  by farm j due to 
the allocation of one unit of resource to contract s by farmer j; sjC is the total cost of contract 
                                                     
 
 
2 Later on we refer to Peerlings and Polman (2009) model as PP model 
3 To model this setting of contractual decision making we follow arguments from Peerlings and Polman (2009) and Masten and 
Saussier (2002) and we adapted them to the specific purposes of this paper.  
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s by farmer j; jX  is a vector of farm and farmer characteristics and features related to farm 
location such as geographical, socio-economic and institutional factors. sjγ is the probability 
that contract s is chosen by farmer j; sjθ represents the farmer j’s resource allocated to 
contract s; j
−
θ resource availability of farm j.  
Equation (1) indicates that the total expect value is the sum of the value from the 
selected contracts. Non participation in policy-related contracts leads to zero profit while 
profit from other activities are ignored as in the original PP model setting (Peerlings and 
Polman, 2009). In other words profit from other than policy-related contracts are not relevant 
in the decision making process we are analysing here.  
Equation (2) shows that value from policy-related contract equals benefits minus costs, 
where revenue refers to payment per unit of resource times the total amount of resources 
allocated to the contract s for the farmer j. Benefits from RDP contracts can be of various 
types. For example in case of measures related to Support Competiveness Schemes (SCS), 
such as an investment-related project linked to the modernization of agricultural holdings. 
This type of RDP measures assumes the form of a transfer of financial resources. This transfer 
is proportional to the overall amount of (private) financial resources which will be dedicated 
by the farmer to the project. In case of Support Agri-environmental Services (SAS) benefits 
assume the form of a per hectare payment, as a compensation of reduced revenue (Polman 
and Slangen, 2008: Peerlings and Polman, 2008; 2009).  
Costs of contract s include the transaction and opportunity costs (forgone profits) 
deriving from the contract commitments. Transactions and opportunity costs are generated by 
the nature of the contractual relation between the public agency and the farmer. This is often 
described as a principal-agent  relationship (Ozanne et al., 2001; White, 2002; Ferraro, 2008). 
As a consequence farmers experience both ex-ante and ex-post transaction costs when they 
have to decide whether or not to participate to an RDP contract. Search and information costs 
are typical ex-ante transaction costs experienced by farmers to get information about funding 
opportunities. Farmers are concerned with information related to the contractual setting, 
therefore the level of support, the type of penalties and the additional production constrains 
due to contract commitments. Negotiation costs are the costs of carrying out the transaction 
and may include administrative and legal costs, such as the costs of negotiating the terms of 
the agreement, and the costs of formally design the contracts (Hobbs, 1997). Ex-post 
transactions costs are for example monitoring costs which occur to the farmer in order to  
ensure that the terms of the RDP contract are adequately fulfilled (i.e. she has provided the 
requested amount and quality of environmental service). 
The specific benefits and costs of equation (2) are unknown in the context of this paper. 
Therefore we assumed that they are dependent on explanatory variables which are known and 
measurable such as farm’s resources allocated in the contract and farmers’ probabilities to 
participate (Masten and Saussier, 2002; Peerlings and Polman, 2009). 
Equations (3) gives the probabilities for entering into a contract as a function of farm 
and farmer’s characteristics, institutional factors and location. Equation (4) indicates that the 
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total amount of farm resources equals those allocated under the different contracts while 
equation (5) is the non-negativity constrain for allocated resources.  
3. ECONOMETRIC STRATEGY 
As pointed out by Peerlings and Polman (2009) it is straightforward that in the 
theoretical model we are using we assume that where costs increase then the probability of 
participation in a RDP contract decreases (and vice-versa). A high probability is assumed to 
be correlated to low (expected) costs associated with RDP contracts, whilst a low probability 
is linked to high (expected) costs (Peerlings and Polman, 2009). Farm and farmer 
characteristics that increase the probability are likely to correlate with low costs. The same 
applies for both institutional issues and location.  
A widely used approach to estimate the probabilities of choosing different contractual 
solutions is to implement a discrete-choice model (Masten and Saussier, 2002). In this case 
the observed contractual choice is considered as an expression of a continuous latent variable 
reflecting the propensity to choose a specific option among different alternatives 
(Defrancesco et al., 2008). The generic empirical model related to farm j to choose a RDP 
contract s can be written as follow: 
 
sjsjsj XY εβ += ''*      Ss ∈∀   (6) 
otherwiseY
YifY
sj
sjsj
0
01 *
=
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    Ss ∈∀   (7) 
where *sjY is the unobservable value of the contract s for farmer j (latent variable), sjY is 
the observable contract choice, 'jX is the vector of explanatory variables for farmer j as 
defined in equation (3), sβ  a vector of coefficients for contract s and sjε a vector of 
unobservable characteristics related to farmer j and contract s.  
Re-arranging  equations (3), (6) and (7) we can derive the probability that contract s is 
chosen by farmer j ( sjγ ) as a function of the potential explanatory variables:  
 
)()()0()0()1( '''
'
*
sjsjsjsjsjsjsjsj XFXPXPYPYP ββεεβγ =−>=>+=>===  (8) 
 
where F denotes the distribution function of the unobservable characteristics sjε . 
Different econometric strategies can be implemented accordingly to the nature of the 
contractual choice analysed and the distributional form it is assumed for F (Verbeek, 2004). 
For example a relatively common approach is to use separate logit/probit models to depict the 
basic binary choice of participation or non-participation in a given RDP contract (Dupraz et 
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al., 2002; Damianos and Giannakopoulos, 2002; Wossink and van Wenum, 2003; 
Vanslembrouck et al., 2002). In this case the decision setting is about (1) choosing a SCS type 
of contract (or not choosing this type of contract) and (2) choosing SAS (or not choosing this 
type of contract). This would lead to a system of (two) equations. The implicit assumption is 
that the probability of choosing SCS is independent from the probability to choose  SAS type 
of contract. But there is a good chance that the farmer likelihood to choose SCS is conditional 
to the decision whether or not to choose SAS type of contract. In other word these decisions 
are likely to be interrelated . The usual alternative would be to estimate a multivariate probit 
model (Polman and Slangen, 2008). With the multivariate probit model again there are 
several decisions, each between two alternatives. However, for each choice a probit model is 
estimated it is assumed that the error terms for the equations are correlated. In the logit, probit 
and multivariate probit model the explanatory variables can be identical between equations 
(choices made), but are not necessarily so. Therefore each choice can have its own 
explanatory variables. As pointed out by Peerlings and Polman (2009) the main disadvantage 
of both separate logit/probit and multivariate probit approaches is that probabilities are 
difficult to interpret because a normalization of probabilities is missing (Verbeek, 2004). Each 
RDP contract is compared to all other choices. In other words, the probability of choosing a 
SCS contract cannot be explicitly linked to the probability of choosing an AES contract. 
Another often used approach is to set a multiple-choice decision-making process using 
multinomial models to investigate both participation  decision and participation in different 
RDP contracts (Wynn et al., 2001; Dupraz et al.,2002; Espinosa-Goded, 2010). In a 
multinomial logit model such a normalisation takes place because the probability of selecting 
a RDP contract is determined relative to the probabilities of other possible contractual choices 
(Verbeek, 2004; Greene 2008). A disadvantage of the multinomial logit is that it assumes that 
either one contract or no contract is selected (just as in a normal logit or probit) not 
considering that a farmer can participate  more than one RDP contract (see Peerlings and 
Polman, 2009).  
Given the opportunities and limitations of each of the above discussed approaches and  
given the purpose of this paper our econometric strategy is to implement both a BVP model 
(model 1) and a MNL model (model 2).   
3.1.  Model 1: the Bivariate Probit (BVP) 
With a bivariate probit model approach the empirical model related to farm j to choose 
a RDP contract s can be written as follow: 
sjsjsj XY εβ += ''*     Ss ∈∀    (8) 
otherwiseY
YifY
sj
sjsj
0
01 *
=
>=
   Ss ∈∀    (9) 
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where *sjY is the unobservable value of the contract s for farmer j (latent variable), sjY is 
the observable contract choice, for s = 1 in case of SCS type of contracts and s = 2 in case of 
SAS type of contracts. As defined in equation (3) 'jX is the vector of explanatory variables for 
farmer j, sβ  a vector of coefficients for contract s and sjε a vector of unobservable 
characteristics related to farmer j and contract s. The BVP model enables us to model farmers’ 
decisions to choose more than one contract simultaneously (Greene, 2003; Capellari and 
Jenkins, 2003). Since the outcomes are treated as binary variables any combination of 
contracts is possible. The contracts can be complements rather that substitutes only (Polman 
and Slangen, 2008). The two equation model (one for s = 1 and the other for s = 2) is featured 
by correlated disturbances, which (due to identification reasons) are assumed to follow a 
normal distribution (variance is normalized to unity). That is for each jth farmer: 
 [ ] [ ] 021 == jj EE εε          [ ] { }1221 ,cov ρρεε ==jj                  (10) 
1]var[]var[ 21 == jj εε                   
 
where ρ is a vector of correlation parameters denoting the extent to which the error 
terms co-vary. Should this be the case, we would need to estimate the two equations jointly, 
following a bivariate normal distribution: { } ( )ρφεε ,1,1,0,0, 221 = . Because in this model we 
are interested in simultaneous contractual decisions we have to define the joint probability. 
For example, the probability of farmer j of choosing the two type of RDP contracts at the 
same time ( )121 == jj YY would be: 
 
),(
),,()1,1(
2
'
21
'
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2122
'
11
'
221
21
ββ
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jj
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jj
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==== ∫∫
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In this model the log-likelihood is then a sum across the four possible contracting 
variables (that is, four possible combinations of participation ( )121 == jj YY  and non-
participation ( )021 == jj YY  times their associated probabilities (Greene, 2003). These 
probabilities may be drawn from (11) as well.  
The most relevant coefficients estimated in the model are 21 , ββ  and )( 12ρρ . The 
latter, if significantly different from zero, will evaluate to which extent each pair of decisions 
are interrelated.  
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3.2. Model 2: the Multinomial Logit (MNL) 
In the MNL approach the empirical model related to farm j to choose a RDP contract s 
can be written as follow: 
 
sjsjsj XY εβ += ''*     Ss ∈∀    (12) 
otherwiseY
YifY
sj
sjsj
0
01 *
=
>=
   Ss ∈∀    (13) 
where *sjY is the unobservable value of the contract s for farmer j (latent variable), sjY is 
the observable contract choice, for { }3,2,1,0=s  representing the four different RDP 
contractual combinations such as non-participation (s=0), participation in SCS (s=1) only, 
participation in SAS (s=2) or both SCS and SAS (s=3). 'jX is the vector of explanatory 
variables for farmer j as defined in equation (3), sβ  a vector of coefficients for contract s and 
sjε a vector of unobservable characteristics related to farmer j and contract s. With a 
multinomial logit function the probability that a farm j selects a contract (or does not 
participate) s is given by: 
 
)exp(
)exp()1( 3
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X
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4.  DATA  
The empirical analysis on Italian farmers’ participation in RDP measures is based on 
the information from the 2006 Farm Accountancy Data Network (FADN). This dataset 
contains detailed information on more than 15,000 farm businesses. The Italian National 
Institute of Agricultural Economics (INEA) is responsible for collecting and organizing the 
FADN on a yearly basis. The data is representative for the population of farmers in Italy and 
it is in line with the formal procedures of the European Commission. Data is counter-checked 
by the National Institute of Statistics (ISTAT). The sample is stratified on three key variables, 
i.e. location (21 NUTS2 regions), economic size (6 classes) and farm types (19 typologies) 
(INEA, 2006). We use the information related to farm location to attach site specific variables 
to each observation. In 2006 FADN recorded farmers participation in RDP measures related 
to the different Regional Rural Development Plans 2000-2006 as defined by the Council 
Regulation (EC) 1259/99. Accordingly we define the two types of RDP contracts (SCS, SAS) 
as described in table A1 in the Appendix.  
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Table 1 shows that a relatively small share of Italian farms is engaged in RDP 
contracts.  
 
Table 1: RDP contracts in Italian farms, 2006 
Share of farms 
Type of RDP contract Non-convergence 
regions 
Convergence 
regions4 Italy 
1. Supporting Competitiveness Schemes (SCS) 7.5 0.6 5.6 
2. Supporting Agri-Environmental Services (SAS) 20.8 14.7 19.1 
Source: own calculations based on FADN (2006) 
 
Table 2 describes the explanatory variables that are used to explain the choice of RDP 
contracts. Accordingly to the theoretical model we select four groups of explanatory variables 
and namely farm and farmer characteristics, institutional characteristics and location.  
 
Table 2. Description of variables  
Variables Explanation Mean Standard deviation 
Internal factors (farm/farmer) 
Farm characteristics 
Farm size small(a) 1 if farm < 16 ESU 0.36 0.48 
Farm structure fixasset (a) Total fixed assets 8,710 23,531 
arable(a) 1 if specialized in arable crop production 0.22 0.41 
horticult(a) 1 if specialized in horticulture 0.07 0.26 
perm_crop(a) 1 if specialized in permanent crops 0.30 0.46 
Farm specialization 
livestock(a) 1 if specialized in livestock 0.23 0.42 
lu_uaa(a) 
Labour intensity measured in Annual 
Working Unit  (AWU) per hectare of 
Utilized Agricultural Area (UAA) 
9.17 491.78 
fam_labor(a) % AWU provided by family members 85.16 25.79 
Labour use 
offfarm 1 if family off-farm labour is present   
Land tenancy uAA_rent(a) % UAA rented 30.13 38.63 
dev_plan(a) 1 if farm followed a business plan for development 0.4957 0.4999 Farm management 
acc_serv(a) 1 if farm used an accountancy service 0.0702 0.2556 
Farmer characteristics  
Type of land manager manager(a) 1 if manager also provides farm labour 0.91 0.29 
Farmer age age(a) Number of years 54.02 13.81 
Presence of successor succes(a) 1 if a successor is present 0.06 0.23 
External factors  
Social capital 
Social security (trust) crim(d) % of households with high perception of 26.00 9.91 
                                                     
 
 
4 As defined by the EU regulations on Structural Funds in the period 2000-2006 the Italian regions belonging to the Objective 1 
– Convergence were Campania, Basilicata, Apulia, Molise, Calabria, Sardinia and Sicily.  
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Variables Explanation Mean Standard deviation 
criminality  
coop(a) 1 if member of agriculture-related 
cooperative 0.52 0.50 Networks 
assoc(a) 1 if member of an association 0.44 0.50 
Farm location     
South south(b) 1 if located in south Italy 0.27 0.45 
Population density pop_den(c) Population density per square km 228.77 379.17 
Mountain mount(b) 1 if located in a mountainous area 0.20 0.40 
Source: (a) INEA, 2006; (b) MIPAAF, 2007; (c) ISTAT, 2001 (d) ISTAT, 2006 
 
Among farm’s characteristics firm size, specialization and structure are considered of 
primarily importance to explain farmers’ participation for example in different agri-
environmental contracts (Wynn et al., 2001; Damianos and Giannakopoulos, 2002; 
Vanslembrouck et al., 2002; Polman and Slangen, 2008; Defrancesco et al., 2008; Peerlings 
and Polman, 2009). Previous findings confirm that the type of AES contract used by farmers  
is different depending on the type of farming system (Wynn et al, 2001; Vanslembrouck et al., 
2002; Polman and Slangen, 2008). For example participating in an agri-environmental 
scheme in an intensive and  specialized dairy farm will be different from implementing the 
same contract on a specialized arable farm (Polman and Slangen, 2008). We also include 
variable related to farm management, family labour and off-farm income. For example 
Jongeneel et al. (2008) indicate that income from non-farming activities  has an important and 
positive role in conditioning farmer likelihood to participate in AES. We also included 
farmer-specific characteristics in the model such as farmer’s age and presence of successor  
(Defrancesco et al., 2008; Polman and Slangen, 2008).  
Factors related to external conditions such as social capital and farm location are also 
taken into account. Based on Polman and Slangen (2008) we introduced indicators related to 
social capital related to: (1) trust in society (criminal); (2) participation in professional 
networks; (3)  participation in social networks. Higher levels of trust in society are expected 
to increase the likelihood of participation. The social networks are more general networks not 
related to agriculture but for example to involvement in sports clubs. Agricultural networks 
focus on improving agricultural practices. Accordingly to Polman and Slangen (2008) 
participation in more general networks increase the probability of choice for agri-
environmental contracts because these farmers feel a large social responsibility. On contrary 
participation in agricultural networks is expected to positively influence participation in 
investment supporting schemes because the farmers are more oriented towards improving on 
agricultural operation (Polman and Slangen, 2008). 
External conditions relate also to farm location. It includes for example the degree of 
rurality (in terms of population density).  Other aspects relate to being located in one of the 
regions of South Italy and in a mountainous area. The relevance of the location of farmers in 
different socio-economic and geographical context has been highlighted in other papers (see 
Vanslembrouck et al., 2002; Vandermeulen; 2006). Vandermeulen et al. (2006) emphasised 
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the role of different institutional environment to shape farmers decisions but also alternative 
business opportunities and dynamicity of business activities.  
5.  RESULTS  
Estimation results and measures to assess the goodness of fit for both model 1 and 
model 2 are reported in table A2 in the Appendix. Hereby we discuss the impact and 
significance of each explanatory variables by comparing the results obtained in the two 
empirical models.   
Several of the explanatory variables related to farm characteristics show a significant 
impact on the likelihood of farmers to participate in RDP contracts. For example being a 
small farm (small) increases the likelihood to participate in RDP contracts and especially join 
decision on SCS and SAS. As stated in the previous section the role of farm size is very 
controversial. In this case the result is in line with previous findings from Vanslembrouck et 
al. (2002) for small farms participation in environmentally-oriented policy contracts while it 
is rather new in terms of participation in investment-related policy contracts. Regarding the 
farming systems, and therefore farm specialization, intensity of inputs use and type of 
management, results indicate that farms specialized in horticulture (horticult), family-farms 
and farms with intense use of labor (lu_uaa) are less likely to participate in RDP contracts. On 
contrary dairy farms, and farms with “advanced” management systems, such as adoption of a 
business and development plan (dev_plan) and use of accountancy service (acc_serv), show a 
positive attitude for both SCS and SAS type of contracts. Land tenure shows a significant 
effect only in model 2 with a negative impact on the likelihood of farmers to contract only 
SAS or SCS while positive in case of participation in both type of policy.  
Farmer characteristics also matter. Oldest farmers are less likely to participate, while 
in case managers are also participating in manual activities in the farm (the most used form of 
management in Italy) they are more willing to participate in both SAS and SCS contracts.  
If we refer to explanatory variables related to social capital issues it is interesting to 
highlight that a negative social embeddedness (distrust in society) leads to a lower partipation 
of farmers in RDP contracts while the opposite is found in case of memebrships in both 
professional and non-strictly professional related networks.  
Finally farm location also matters. More specifically being located in one of the regions 
of South Italy where decreases the likelihood to participate in both SCS and SAS, while 
location in a mountainous area (mount) increases farmers likelihood to partipate in RDP 
contracts.  
6. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
European public intervention in rural development became concrete in the 1970s with 
the so-called socio-structural directives, chiefly devoted to modernizing the farm sector. In the 
years to follow, the approach evolved, increasingly privileging the area element over the 
sectoral element. Thus several principles were established and consolidated in time, including 
not only improvements in farm efficiency but also the enhancement of its multifunctional role 
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and the creation of a link between agriculture and region, chiefly aiming to forge sustainable 
paths of local development. The essentially role to be played by rural areas in the balanced 
development of European society was thus officially recognised and supported. Agenda 2000 
moved closer to an organic policy for rural development guided by principles of integration 
among economic activities, of sustainability, promotion of diversification and subsidiarity 
(which privileges the active role of local economic and social stakeholders in programming 
and managing interventions). Today, with the enlargement to 27 Member States, 90% of EU 
territory consists of areas classified as rural, comprising about 50% of Europe’s population. 
The heterogeneity of rural areas in Europe has thus increased in recent years: this has led to 
greater social and economic differences within Europe’s rural context. Some areas experience 
difficult geomorphological conditions and suffer from socio-demographic decline, while 
others, especially those close to large conglomerations, are subject to expansive urban 
pressures and to inevitable competition for land use.  
In light of such considerations, the need to support and contextualise intervention 
within the new scenario of the enlarged EU was reinforced first with the Fischler Reform in 
2003, which permitted a transfer of resources from Pillar I to Pillar II, and then with the 
renewed set of objectives and actions configured by Regulation 1698/20055, with which more 
space was given to the programming and management functions of local partnerships and 
with which the room for manoeuvre was extended by new opportunities tied to scenario 
developments (especially with regard to quality, animal welfare and energy saving).  
In the light of the results achieved carrying out our analysis, and due to the 
unsatisfactory actual public intervention, a point which clearly surface lies in the difficulty of 
the current RDP framework to warrant a widespread significant impact on farms 
competitiveness. It would appear the need for a more targeted framework of RDP policy by 
achieve the main objective declared by the EC throughout the years and the Reform.   
In fact, it is often the more marginal areas which are stewards of outstandingly 
important environmental assets, whose continuity in time can only be ensured by human 
presence and by agricultural activities able to offer both economic support and environmental 
services. In such areas the CAP must continue to be a bulwark against depopulation and 
environmental degradation. This may be done by privileging agriculture that respects the 
environment and is capable of enhancing the area’s specific value, but also with more incisive 
action to promote diversification of local economies. This will help all the stakeholders in 
such areas to play an ever more active role in performing economic and social services.  
In sum, strengthening regional competitiveness and attractiveness and reducing 
disparities among the regions is indeed a big challenge which deserves its own agenda. 
To achieve such a vision, the European Commission should use all the opportunities 
offered by its regulatory, budget and coordination power and responsibilities in view of 
ensuring: 
                                                     
 
 
5 Regulation for rural development policy for the period 2007-2013, focused on three themes or thematic axes, and the Leader 
approach (or fourth thematic axis) which permits the setting-up and implementation of highly specific projects by local 
partnerships so as to respond to particular local problems. 
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• A good balance between investment in infrastructure and in soft measures to improve 
the competitiveness and attractiveness of all regions. 
• Strong coordination of all EU policies having a spatial dimension, even if they are 
primarily defined as having sectorial one, in order to create critical mass and leverage 
effects at mesoeconomic level. 
• A framework for a concept of Community Interest Programmes focusing on thematic 
priorities to give EU interventions a greater visibility. This should be implemented by 
programmes rather than by multiple projects. 
• An increased use of all revolving financial instruments in order to improve the 
formation and availability of equity capital in the regions. 
• Qualitative evaluation criteria for the implementation of the cohesion policy in order to 
ensure higher added value of EU interventions and avoid small-scale "political wishes" 
projects. 
• Alignment of European funding with regional priorities by providing a greater role to 
regions in the management and implementation of programmes in order to maximise 
the leveraging effects of EU financial contributions. 
• Stronger integration of rural development in the cohesion policy. 
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Appendix  
Table A1: Definition of RDP contracts used in the micro-econometric analysis 
RDP contract choice 
RDP measures  
2000-2006  
Description of the support scheme 
(a) Investment in 
agricultural holdings 
The total amount of support, expressed as a percentage of the volume of eligible 
investment, is limited to a maximum of 40% and 50% in less favoured areas. Where 
investments are undertaken by young farmers these percentages may reach a maximum 
of 45% and 55% in less-favoured areas. 
(b) Young farmers setting 
up 
The setting-up aid may comprise (i) a single premium up to the maximum eligible 
amount of 25,000 euro per farmer, (ii)  an interest subsidy on loans taken on with a 
view to covering the costs arising from setting up; the capitalized value of the interest 
subsidy may not exceed the value of the premium. 
(c) Training The total amount of support is a percentage of the total investment in training activities fixed per year and farm at Member State level.  
(g) Improving processing 
and marketing of 
agricultural products 
The total amount of support, expressed as a percentage of the volume of eligible 
investment, is limited to a maximum of (a) 50% in Objective 1 regions and (b) 40% in 
the other regions. 
(m) Marketing of quality 
agricultural products and 
setting up of quality 
schemes 
The total amount of support is set as a percentage of the total investment in marketing 
and quality management activities per year and farm at Member State level. 
(j) Land improvement The total amount of support is a percentage of the total investment in land improvement fixed per year and farm at Member State level. 
(1) Supporting Competitiveness 
Schemes (SCS) 
Investment subsidies for 
supporting the 
competitiveness of 
agricultural activities: 
 
all subsidies for investment 
in farm assets (agricultural 
land, human capital, 
buildings, property rights, 
forest, land, machinery and 
equipment) received during 
the accounting year. They 
also include any subsidies 
on interest rates. In 
addition, they may include 
national (or regional) 
investment aids 
(y) Use of farm advisory 
services 
The total amount of support is a percentage of the total investment in advisory services 
fixed per year and farm at Member State level. 
(Table A1 continue) 
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(f) Agri-environment 
Support is granted to farmers who give agri-environmental commitments for at least 
five years. Where necessary, a longer period is determined for particular types of 
commitments in view of their environmental effects. Support in respect of an agri-
environmental commitment shall be granted annually and be calculated on the basis of 
(1) income foregone, (2) additional costs resulting from the commitment given, and (3) 
the need to provide an incentive. The cost of any non-remunerative capital works 
necessary for the fulfilment of the commitments may also be taken into account in 
calculating the level of annual support. Maximum amounts per year eligible for 
community support are  600 euro per hectare in case of annual crops, 900 euro per 
hectare in case of specialized perennial crops and 450 euro per hectare in case of other 
land uses. These amounts shall be based on that area of the holding to which agri-
environmental commitments apply. 
(e1) Less-favoured areas 
and areas with 
environmental restrictions 
Compensatory allowances granted to farmers per hectare of areas used for agriculture.  
Minimum compensatory allowance is fixed in 25 euro and maximum compensatory 
allowance is fixed in 200 euro per hectare of areas used for agriculture. 
(h) Afforestation of 
agricultural land 
Support shall be granted for the afforestation of agricultural land provided that such 
planting is adapted to local conditions and is compatible with the environment. Such 
support may include in addition to planting costs (i) an annual premium per hectare 
afforested to cover maintenance costs for a period of up to five years, (ii) an annual 
premium per hectare to cover loss of income resulting from afforestation for a 
maximum period of 20 years for farmers or associations thereof who worked the land 
before its afforestation or for any other private law person. 
Maximum amounts per year of the annual premium to cover loss of income eligible for 
community support are fixed in 725 per hectare 
(i) Other forestry measures 
Payments are granted to the beneficiaries provided that the protective and ecological 
values of these forests are ensured in a sustainable manner and the measures to be 
carried out are laid down by contract and their cost specified therein. Payments are 
fixed between a minimum payment of 40 euro per hectare and a maximum payment of 
120 euro per hectare. 
(2) Supporting Agri-
Environmental Services (SAS) 
Rural development 
(“second pillar”) direct 
payments due to 
agricultural activities 
which provide 
environmental  services: 
all direct payments received 
during the accounting year. 
(t) Protection of the 
environment  
The total amount of payment is a percentage of the costs determined per year and/or 
farm and/or hectare at Member State level. 
Source: own elaboration based on Reg. CE (1257/99) and European Commission (2009) 
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Table A2: Comparison of the estimation results of the MVP model (Model 1) and the MNL model (Model 2) 
BVP (Model 1)  MNL (Model 2) 
SCS  SAS  SCS  SAS  SCS and SAS Explanatory variables 
Coef.  Coef.  Coef.  Coef.  Coef. 
cons -1.7345 ( 0.1667 ) ***  -0.3810 ( 0.0987 ) ***  -2.8124 ( 0.4640 ) ***  -0.4497 ( 0.1851 ) **  -5.2039 ( 0.5523 ) *** 
small 0.3612 ( 0.0459 ) ***  0.1719 ( 0.0283 ) ***  -0.0335 ( 0.1429 )   0.0900 ( 0.0539 ) *  1.4441 ( 0.1280 ) *** 
fixasset  0.0000 ( 0.0000 ) **  0.0000 ( 0.0000 )   0.0000 ( 0.0000 )   0.0000 ( 0.0000 )   0.0000 ( 0.0000 ) *** 
arable -0.0925 ( 0.0699 )   -0.0637 ( 0.0395 )   -0.2991 ( 0.1920 )   -0.1268 ( 0.0729 ) *  -0.2470 ( 0.2574 )  
horticult -0.3715 ( 0.1195 ) ***  -0.5747 ( 0.0708 ) ***  -1.2261 ( 0.3528 ) ***  -1.1633 ( 0.1487 ) ***  -0.9741 ( 0.4689 ) ** 
perm_crop -0.0958 ( 0.0647 )   0.0217 ( 0.0373 )   -0.4741 ( 0.1827 ) ***  -0.0120 ( 0.0688 )   0.0343 ( 0.2140 )  
livestock 0.3867 ( 0.0621 ) ***  0.1643 ( 0.0388 ) ***  0.3508 ( 0.1730 ) *  0.1216 ( 0.0722 ) *  1.2040 ( 0.1962 ) *** 
lu_uaa -0.0106 ( 0.0045 ) **  -0.0017 ( 0.0007 ) **  -0.0178 ( 0.0107 ) *  -0.0034 ( 0.0017 ) **  -0.0506 ( 0.0238 ) ** 
fam_labor -0.0073 ( 0.0010 ) ***  -0.0023 ( 0.0006 ) ***  -0.0101 ( 0.0028 ) ***  -0.0023 ( 0.0012 ) **  -0.0171 ( 0.0029 ) *** 
offfarm 0.1766 ( 0.0483 ) ***  -0.1268 ( 0.0310 ) ***  0.4414 ( 0.1371 ) ***  -0.2973 ( 0.0606 ) ***  0.1372 ( 0.1361 )  
uAA_rent 0.0002 ( 0.0006 )   0.0003 ( 0.0003 )   -0.0046 ( 0.0017 ) ***  -0.0006 ( 0.0007 )   0.0058 ( 0.0016 ) *** 
dev_plan 0.4500 ( 0.0462 ) ***  0.2304 ( 0.0262 ) ***  0.5127 ( 0.1295 ) ***  0.2804 ( 0.0490 ) ***  1.8533 ( 0.1702 ) *** 
Farm 
characterstics 
acc_serv 0.7917 ( 0.0571 ) ***  0.8606 ( 0.0437 ) ***  1.1717 ( 0.1788 ) ***  1.2282 ( 0.0815 ) ***  2.2462 ( 0.1453 ) *** 
manager 0.1993 ( 0.0932 ) **  0.0913 ( 0.0511 ) *  0.1954 ( 0.2468 )   0.1135 ( 0.0966 )   0.7314 ( 0.3461 ) ** 
age -0.0016 ( 0.0016 )   -0.0030 ( 0.0010 ) ***  -0.0111 ( 0.0048 ) *  -0.0066 ( 0.0019 ) ***  0.0037 ( 0.0048 )  Farmer 
characteristic 
succes 0.0898 ( 0.0779 )   -0.0474 ( 0.0539 )   0.2992 ( 0.2066 )   -0.0763 ( 0.1017 )   -0.0235 ( 0.2172 )  
criminalit -0.0121 ( 0.0025 ) ***  -0.0156 ( 0.0014 ) ***  -0.0002 ( 0.0069 )   -0.0208 ( 0.0025 ) ***  -0.0612 ( 0.0076 ) *** 
coop 0.1610 ( 0.0424 ) ***  0.0773 ( 0.0263 ) ***  0.0828 ( 0.1254 )   0.0366 ( 0.0494 )   0.6268 ( 0.1235 ) *** Social capital 
assoc 0.1438 ( 0.0505 ) ***  -0.1048 ( 0.0287 ) ***  0.3123 ( 0.1572 ) *  -0.1985 ( 0.0529 ) ***  0.0070 ( 0.1366 )  
south -0.8575 ( 0.0794 ) ***  -0.0818 ( 0.0306 ) ***  -1.8151 ( 0.2503 ) ***  -0.0859 ( 0.0566 )   -2.4935 ( 0.3693 ) *** 
pop_den 0.0000 ( 0.0001 )   -0.0004 ( 0.0001 ) ***  0.0000 ( 0.0002 )   -0.0010 ( 0.0001 ) ***  -0.0002 ( 0.0002 )  Farm location 
mount 0.6830 ( 0.0480 ) ***  0.2953 ( 0.0314 ) ***  0.8832 ( 0.1405 ) ***  0.2188 ( 0.0596 ) ***  1.9485 ( 0.1487 ) *** 
 ΡSCS,SAS 0.2097 ( 0.0200 ) ***                         
  
  
Likelihood ratio test of  rho21 = 0:  chi2(1) =  105.271    > chi2 = 0.0000  Log likelihood = -8658.8463; Pseudo-R
2 
= 0.1665; LR chi2(63) = 3458.68  P > chi2 = 0.0000 
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Statistical significance: * = P < 0.10; ** = P < 0.05; *** = P <0.01; Standard errors in parenthesis; N. obs. = 15,380
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